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 It has been argued in this journal (Callicott, et.al., 2009) that the evidence 
advanced that Aldo Leopold was influenced by American Pragmatism is “imaginary,” 
and that apparent textual evidence that Leopold learned key ideas from A.T. Hadley, 
President of Yale University and a self-avowed Pragmatist, can be explained away.  It is 
shown that Callicott, et. al. misunderstand pragmatism, misunderstand what 
environmental pragmatists have attributed to Leopold, fail to understand either the 
context or the internal argument of Leopold’s “Conservation as a Moral Issue.”  
Consequently, they miss important contributions that Leopold made to the philosophy of 
conservation. 
 





 Leopold, Hadley, and Darwin: 
Darwinian Epistemology, Truth and Right 
 
Part 1: Introduction. 
Despite feeling seriously outnumbered, I must respond to the detailed and text-
based arguments thought by Callicott, et. al. (2009), to bear on the question whether Aldo 
Leopold was influenced by American Pragmatism. ii  I also feel some level of confidence, 
despite the gang tackling, since my “imaginings” regarding Aldo Leopold were thought 
to require the labor of no less than six defenders of orthodoxy.  In my response, I will 
mostly not dispute what is in the written record, published or otherwise.  Instead, I will 
argue (1) that Callicott and his followers misunderstand the ideas Leopold absorbed from 
Hadley and the pragmatists, and they attribute to Leopold many Hadlean views that 
Leopold never espoused, nor have I said or implied that he did; (2) that most of the 
textual evidence cited and the arguments brought forward based on that evidence are 
simply beside the point, and (3) that their misunderstanding on this point causes them to 
miss what is most important in Leopold’s contribution to our understanding of how to 
live in harmony with natural systems.  
After this brief introduction, Part 2 will begin by clarifying one point on which I 
was perhaps unclear in the1988 paper and, building on that clarification, I will articulate 
more precisely the key Pragmatist idea that Leopold took from Hadley and used 
ubiquitously throughout his career, the idea that experience is the unified epistemological 
method of both ethics and epistemology. This discussion will illuminate more precisely 
what Leopold absorbed from Hadley, which emphasizes Hadley’s epistemological views 
more than the social views Callicott, et. al., rail against.  In particular, I will correct 
Callicott, et.al.’s mistaken equation of utilitarianism, progressivism, and social 
Darwinism, because it causes them to and miss the key point that Leopold adopted a post-
Pinchotist version of progressivism that I, and others, call the “third way,” which steers 
between Economistic utilitarianism and robust, monistic nonanthropocentrism (Norton, 
2005, pp. 72-73; Minteer, 2006).  Then, in Part 3, I will concentrate on the proper 
interpretation of Leopold’s formative essay, “Some Fundamentals of Conservation in the 
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Southwest,” (“Some Fundamentals”) (1923), arguing that Callicott et.al.’s reading of this 
essay totally misses the signposting Leopold included in order to make the final section 
of that essay a coherent argument.  Under their reading, the last section of “Some 
Fundamentals” is a disorganized ethical rant. Finally, in Part 4, I will look back at the 
evidence, textual and otherwise, that Leopold rejected what he learned from the most 
popular teacher at Yale.  In the Conclusion, I will mention the unfortunate consequences 
of failing to recognize Leopold’s early and important appeal to the Pragmatist method of 
experience, and of learning by doing. 
Part 2:  What, Exactly, did Leopold Learn from Pragmatists? 
In my 1988 essay, “The Constancy of Leopold’s Land Ethic,” I made claims that I 
would reformulate today, not because I have forsaken my belief that Leopold adopted and 
used important elements of a Pragmatist philosophy throughout his life, but because I 
would revise somewhat how I describe that constant element.  There is no question that 
Leopold underwent an important change between, say, 1920 and 1935, perhaps making 
the title of my 1988 paper misleading to some.  I would also agree that this change 
involved a rejection of Pinchot’s ardent utilitarianism as an adequate and comprehensive 
guide to conservation management—again, I believe that Callicott and I agree on this.  
The disagreement, rather, involves what, exactly, changed, and what Leopold’s ideas 
became. 
In the 1988 essay, I also cited a passage from Hadley in which, referring to 
William James, he celebrates the beliefs that “have preserved our fathers as an intuition 
and act on [them] as an instinct” (Hadley, 1913, p. 73) That phrase, taken out of context, 
may have encouraged readers to think I was attributing to Leopold acceptance of all or 
most of Hadley’s ideas and, especially, that I see the “instinct” on which we act as static 
and unchanging. Today, I would skip the reference to intuition, which implies far less 
dynamism than Leopold’s approach to learning through action, and instead I would 
emphasize that the key idea Leopold took from Hadley was a Pragmatic approach to 
knowledge in both science and morality.  Leopold’s beliefs, I should have said, despite 
significant changes in other respects (including a rejection of utilitarianism as a reliable 
and complete guide to conservation policy), held tightly throughout his career to a 
general epistemology based on experience.  With respect to this latter commitment, 
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Leopold never strayed from the central epistemological idea of pragmatism:  there is one 
method, and only one method for pursuing the truth, and that method is the method of 
experience.  Learning in science depends upon it; learning how to live a full life depends 
upon it; and learning what is right and ethical is also a matter of experience.   
I realize now that my particular way of making my point—claiming a “constancy” 
in Leopold’s thought--misleadingly overstated my case.  By 1923, Leopold had fastened 
onto the Darwinian/Pragmatic idea of testing “ideas” by observing the outcome of actions 
based on those ideas—experience.  This aspect of his thought did not wane, and even 
intensified over time.   Today, I would more circumspectly say that the other changes 
Leopold underwent between 1923 and his death were less important than, and mostly 
derivative upon, this central idea, because it functioned throughout his life as an antidote 
to ideology and disagreement without experimentation.  More specifically, in response to 
Callicott,  et.al.’s statement that according to me, “Leopold underwent no significant 
philosophical change in his long career as a practicing conservationist,” I would clarify 
that he underwent no change in his philosophy of management, and that his rejection of 
utilitarianism—already full-blown in 1923 on my interpretation—was based more on 
empirical observation of management failures on the Southwestern Forest Reserves than 
on ideological speculation.  
While on the topic of Leopold’s changing views of utilitarianism, I should correct 
Callicott, et.al.’s misleading suggestion that I think Leopold, subsequent to his embrace 
of Pragmatism, continued to embrace Pinchot’s version of utilitarianism.  Indeed, 
Callicott, et.al. conflate Pragmatism with capitalistic utilitarianism, which misses the key 
implication that Leopold found a “third way” between Pinchot’s utilitarian resource 
management and outright nonanthropocentrism (Norton, 2005, pp. 72-73).iii  In fact, I 
understand the final section of Some Fundamentals to embody a first step in his 
declaration of independence from Pinchot and his strongly production-oriented version of 
anthropocentric utilitarianism. 
My point about constancy was to say that Leopold had adopted this idea of the 
epistemology of experience for a very specific purpose, and this change had already taken 
place by 1923.  Leopold considered the failing managerial efforts of land managers in the 
Southwest (himself included) as the relevant “experience” for refuting Pinchot’s 
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utilitarian boosterism. My point, then, in emphasizing what stayed the same in Leopold’s 
“philosophy of management” was the rule of experience—if the practices of a culture 
destroy the land and relationships on which the culture depends, it does not have the 
truth; in particular, Leopold already knew—based on his observation of the negative 
impacts of applying Pinchot’s utilitarian management idea that the test of experience was 
proving that idea “false”. 
I thought I had made it clear that I attributed only a narrow aspect of Hadley’s 
philosophy when, in section 2.3 of Sustainability, I introduced the ideas that I attribute to 
Leopold as embracing the pragmatic method, with emphasis on an evaluative “model” 
Leopold adopted and used.  Particularly, Leopold meant to apply the rule of experience to 
the management of the Southwest Territories: he, like Hadley, saw in the method of 
experience a Darwinian criterion that cuts through ideology and focuses on practices, on 
how a culture treats its land.  In this case, it was a handy way of comparing the practices 
of various cultures by “measuring” their impact on the same expanse of semi-arid land he 
currently managed. Once it is recognized that the “model” I claim Leopold borrowed 
from Hadley does not entail an endorsement of Hadley’s “jingoism” and praise for 
capitalism, the bulk of the Callicott et.al., paper is irrelevant to the current discussion 
because most of the paper is devoted to criticizing Hadleian ideas that neither Leopold, 
nor I, accept any responsibility for. 
Part 2A: Pragmatism: Some Core Ideas 
Before we can assess how this more targeted, epistemological understanding of 
Leopold’s debt to the Pragmatists affected him, it is necessary to begin with a reasonably 
accurate summary of what Pragmatists’ most centrally believe.  While agreeing with 
Callicott and colleagues that it is important to recognize diversity among Pragmatists, I 
do not recognize any of the four “bedrock beliefs” Callicott, et.al., claim I attribute to 
Pragmatists (Callicott, et. al., 2009, p. 457) and I certainly do not endorse these 
statements just because they assert I believe them. Even if they can associate their 
phrases with snippets of my writings, that does not mean these foreign-sounding phrases 
reflect what I mean by Pragmatism, and taken together, these supposedly bedrock beliefs 
add up to no coherent philosophy such as I develop in (2005). 
A better try at providing a coherent account of the core themes of pragmatists is 
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found in an essay by Richard Bernstein, “Pragmatism, Pluralism, and the Healing of 
Wounds”  (1997, pp. 385-389).  Like the Callicott group and many others, Bernstein also 
recognizes the extensive variations in beliefs of Pragmatists, but he lists five  
“interrelated substantive themes that enable us to characterize the pragmatic ethos”:  (1) 
Anti-Foundationalism; (2)  Fallibilism; (3) The social meaning of the self;  (4)  
Contingency; and (5) Pluralism (Bernstein, 1999). Brief characterizations of these 
themes, plus a perusal of Callicott’s writings, will demonstrate both how far Callicott 
et.al. are from understanding pragmatism, and how they--and Callicott in his single-
authored work--often boldly, but naively, challenge pragmatist viewpoints without 
understanding them. 
(1) Anti-Foundationalism: Foundationalism, as pragmatists understand it—and  as  
the term is used in modern and contemporary epistemology—is the view that, in order for 
humans to know anything, there must be some set of sentences that depend for their truth 
on no other sentences.  Richard Fumerton, writing in the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, on line, describes the foundationalists thesis “in short is that all knowledge 
and justified belief rest ultimately on a foundation of noninferential knowledge or 
justified belief.”  Most contemporary epistemologists have recognized that such a view is 
inconsistent with a strict form of empiricism; they have also doubted the rationalists 
reasoning in favor of foundational knowledge.  They recognize that much of human 
knowledge is obtained while making assumptions, what traditional philosophers of 
science call “background assumptions” which give meaning to scientific experiments and 
less traditional philosophers call a “paradigm”.  It is possible to evaluate the truth of some 
sentences while assuming others. Pragmatists reject the foundationalist claims that our 
knowledge, in order to be rationally justified, must rest on some premises not open to 
challenge by experience. Peirce, for example, sought to replace the epistemological 
analogy of a “foundation” with a “cable.” 
(2) Fallibilism:  Pragmatists believe that every one of our beliefs is open to 
challenge, but Pragmatists do not embrace skepticism; they believe that “although we 
must begin any inquiry with prejudgments and can never call everything into question at 
once, nevertheless, there is no belief or thesis—no matter how fundamental—that is not 
open to further interpretation and criticism.” (Bernstein, p. 287) Post-foundational 
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epistemologists have adopted an alternative view of justification: it is possible to evaluate 
the truth of claims while assuming some of our beliefs to be true, provided each of those 
assumption in turn is open to challenge and correction in its own right. 
(3)  The Social Character of the Self.  Since all of our beliefs are considered 
fallible, we are always limited in perspective and yet knowledge creation proceeds.  
According to Pragmatists, truth must be pursued through a community of inquirers, and 
correction of beliefs is a social activity. Peirce said:  “Logic is rooted in the social 
principle.” (Peirce,      )  Further, since our thoughts are so thoroughly linguisticized, the 
language of a community shapes thoughts and the thoughts that are communicated. 
(4) Radical Contingency.   Pragmatists believe that the universe is wholly 
contingent, that there is chance in the universe, and that the world is encountered as risk 
and opportunity and it is up to humans and human communities to make sense of this 
contingent universe.  While many empiricists have tried to stabilize beliefs by identifying 
linguistic forms as providing stability in the form of “analytic truths,” this form of 
stability is elusive in itself, as living languages constantly change as they are used to 
communicate and cooperate.  As the practices of communities change, their language 
changes as well.  The categories which we divide the world into, which reflect our 
language, are ephemeral and constantly open to revision.  Incomplete understanding of 
this Pragmatic theme causes Callicott , et. al. not to see how important language is to 
Pragmatists, and how thoroughly they reject necessary truths.  
(5) Pluralism:   Central to Pragmatism is the idea of “pluralism,” which has two, 
related aspects.  First, pluralism is advanced as a description of the world we encounter.   
In everyday life, as well as in philosophy, we encounter many different frameworks of 
understanding, individuals who espouse different views, and fields/sub-fields whose 
members develop different jargons and different starting points, facing us with a difficult 
task even to understand, much less to agree with, other philosophers, other acquaintances, 
and other cultures (Minteer and Manning, 1999).  “What makes this task [of 
understanding] so difficult and unstable,” says Bernstein (p. 397, quoting Richard Rorty), 
“is the growing realization that there are no uncontested rules or procedures ‘which will 
tell us how rational agreement can be reached on what would settle the issue on every 
point where statements seem to conflict.’”  
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  Associated with this pluralization of our experience in dealing with others is a 
second aspect, a serene acceptance of the plurality of worldviews and perspectives.  Once 
one enters the pluralistic world of the Pragmatist, and recognizes that reduction of all 
points of view to a single, authoritative and certainly correct view of reality will never 
happen, one adopts a new, less argumentative attitude.  This attitude accepts the 
complexity of the world, and the many conceptual and theoretical tools humans have 
created to understand that complex world, and seeks cross-perspectival understanding, 
believing that it is reasonable to expect that one will learn something from alternative 
points of view, even ones one finds initially foreign or even abhorrent.  As Bernstein 
says: “Here one begins with the assumption that the other has something to say to us and 
to contribute to our understanding”  (p 399). 
Callicott sees the world from the viewpoint of a strongly committed monist, and 
he explicitly rejects Pragmatists’ powerful arguments for contingency, fallibilism and 
anti-foundationalism in his single-authored works, so it is not surprising that Callicott, 
et.al. find it difficult to comprehend the Pragmatist tradition. Callicott, for example, 
strongly endorses foundationalism (1999, p. 507).  It is unclear in what sense Callicott 
understands foundationalism in that, if we take him to be endorsing foundationalism as 
defined by epistemologists, his position is apparently inconsistent with his claim that 
neither he nor any other environmental philosophers endorse a priori knowledge.  
Foundational knowledge is a priori in that the foundations must be undisputable. 
Before proceeding to discuss how these ideas were embodied in Leopold’s early 
philosophy of management, one point needs clarification.  Callicott, et. al. protest that I 
seem to offer only two epistemological options, and then describes two options, one of 
which they characterize as ‘a priori’ ethics and the other as, “Hadley’s definition.”  He 
then protests:  “An epistemological mean lies between (a) the Cartesian extreme of a 
priori, self-evident truth and (b) the putatively Pragmatic extreme of a good guiding 
metaphor whose ‘truth’ is determined by the practical success of behavior guided by it.  
The mean between these two extremes is the epistemology of science.” (p. 471)  To 
Callicott, et.al., then, I am simply confused by insisting on the method of experience and 
using it to criticize a priori elements in his and other environmental philosophies.  They 
say, “No one, as far as we are aware, has ever asserted that [a nonanthropocentric ethic 
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is] true a priori, nor certainly, that Leopold himself ever thought so.” (p. 470)  I am in 
agreement regarding Leopold,--that’s my point when I attribute a full-blown experience-
based epistemology to him.  With respect to contemporary environmental ethicists, 
however, I disagree.   
Of course it is true, that there is a great deal of room between the two horns of the 
dilemma they falsely attribute to me,iv but Callicott misunderstands the Pragmatist 
position.  Within that middle ground one can identify degrees to which various empiricist 
philosophies have taken to heart the idea of radical empiricism and radical contingency.  
The first step toward empiricism is to accept that all substantive knowledge about the 
world (non-tautologous sentences, what Kant called “synthetic” judgments) is to be 
expressed in sentences that are empirically falsifiable.  At this first step, it is still accepted 
that tautologies are certain because they will be true in all possible worlds, and hence 
empiricists at this step still have a concept of necessity and, by implication, a cache of 
sentences that can be considered true, come what may, and these sentences can be taken 
as true, or given, and to some extent, at least, as immune to criticism.  Indeed, this was 
the semi-stable position empiricists had been moving toward since Hume’s distinction 
between “matters of fact” and “relations of ideas”, (Hume, 1748, Section IV, Part 1) and 
it found a stable, if controversial home in the philosophy of logical empiricism.  At last it 
seemed that empiricists had made their peace with necessity; necessity resides in our 
belief system in the form of meaning relationships which, in turn, rest on “rules of 
language.”     
Willard Van Orman Quine, however, discomfited this apparent stability by noting 
that the rules of language can change, and in living languages they often change because 
of new and unexpected observations; there is no sharp distinction between changing a 
belief and changing a rule of language; both are attempts to make our belief system, 
based on stored observations, current with incoming stimuli (Quine, 1953).  On the 
Quinean view, which of course was inspired by James and Peirce, since all necessity is de 
dicto, not de re, it follows that tautologies are only as stable as the language in which 
they are expressed.  They are not labels for “natural  kinds,” unified by timeless 
“essences,” nor do they offer necessity in Kant’s classical sense of universality.  In 
ordinary discourse, especially over time, not just the labels of categories change, 
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linguistic creativity—following human endeavors to communicate in ever-changing 
situations—reshuffles membership in the categories.  Helpful categories and terms come 
to the fore, terms that have no use in communicating important or interesting insights 
gradually disappear. 
Pragmatists had anticipated Quine’s idea of radical contingency and they 
recognized that this deep form of contingency, based in the evolution of language in the 
face of new tasks and new situations, and implied that language is a dynamic, adaptive 
tool, rather than a system of labels applied to categories arranged in nature according to 
essences.v  Callicott, et. al., not fully understanding the profundity of the Pragmatists’ 
understanding of contingency, including contingency of language, deny they or any other 
environmental ethicists support their views on a priori grounds.  This is a claim that must 
be examined.  
 As an example, let us consider some of the assertions of Callicott himself, both in 
the present article and in prior work.   Are there any ‘a priori’ elements in Callicott’s 
environmental philosophy?  Let us take the following sentences: "In the literature of 
academic environmental philosophy and ethics—which emerged…in the mid-1970s—
values are classified dichotomously as (A) instrumental and (B) intrinsic. The value of 
something as a means to an end other than itself is instrumental.  The value of something 
for itself, for its own sake, as an end in itself is intrinsic."  (Minteer, 2009, p. 143) In 
another recent paper, Callicott makes a similar pronouncement, "We subjects value 
objects in one or both of at least two ways—instrumentally or intrinsically—between 
which there is no middle term" (Callicott, 2002, p. 16).  While one cannot help but note 
the differing characterizations of the source of the distinction—in one case it is based on 
the esoteric language of a sub-specialty of ethics as discussed by a small group of 
professional philosophers, while in the second case the distinction is attributed to 
everyday linguistic usage—let us extract from the two sources a statement apparently 
implied by both:  
S:  Environmental values are of two types: instrumental or intrinsic.”   
What is the epistemological status of S?  If we ask how we would determine 
whether S is true, it would appear that, in order to support S on on the basis of usage by 
environmental ethicists, we must first establish that the dichotomous theories of ethics 
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introduced and defended by environmental ethicists are “true” (Williams, 1985).  Given 
that Pragmatist environmental ethicists deny that our values can be sharply separated as 
claimed in S, to simply rest the case for S on the linguistic practice of monistic 
nonanthropocentrists in the present context is simply question-begging.    
 The second explanation of why Callicott and colleagues believe S, on the other 
hand, rests on an account of everyday linguistic usage.  While I cannot remember the last 
time I heard a non-philosopher or a person not influenced by philosophical jargon 
actually use this distinction, let us grant that ordinary speakers honor the distinction 
mentioned in S.  That would provide as much support for S as noting that most people 
speak of the sun “rising” in the morning concluding that Copernicus is thereby refuted!  
If we search modern languages, it is not difficult to find vestiges of dualism, reference to 
“souls,” etc., even though scientific theory cannot countenance such. Basing claims of the 
way things are on the way people speak about them—treating S as an empirically 
supported statement—is clearly inadequate.  Surely Callicott, et.al., do not intend to rest 
their whole philosophy of value on the shifting sands of dynamic linguistic usage.   
Alternatively, perhaps the Callicottians believe S is an analytic sentence, true by 
virtue of the rules of language.  This move would be consistent with declaring Callicott 
an empiricist who has taken the first step, recognizing that necessity does not exist in the 
world, but he is still seeking certainty in the rules of language.  Here, he runs afoul of 
Quine’s Pragmatist argument that analytic truths are truths for specific languages, and 
that languages change as new empirical information becomes available, and as social 
relations and practices change. Callicott, et. al. can thus confidently support S on the 
basis of rules of linguistic usage only if they deny the conventional nature of language 
and hold language constant and unquestioned.   
 Have philosophers such as Callicott avoided a priori commitments?  They have 
done so only by assuming a false empirical claim that language is fixed and implying that 
truths derived from the rules of language need not be questioned with regard to their 
continuing usefulness in emerging situations.  While one might not classify such 
linguistically anchored rules as true “a priori,” they function like a priori rules that shape 
experience and control how one is allowed to speak about reality.  One of Quine’s 
contributions was to cut through the various linguistic dichotomies between analytic vs. 
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synthetic, necessary vs. contingent, a priori vs. a posteriori, possible vs. impossible, and 
ask: are there sentences we will not give up under any pattern or accumulation of 
empirical evidence?  In fact Callicott, referring casually to linguistic behavior of 
specialists and ordinary speakers as a basis for classifying all environmental values, has 
not and will not call his central distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value into 
question.  There is, of course, obvious evidence that most people value nature in many 
and diverse ways, and that they describe these values in many vernaculars, and yet, for 
Callicott, the statement that there are two and only two ways to value nature lies beyond 
sincere doubt.  In that sense, it functions as an a priori element in Callicott’s incompletely 
empiricist position. In this sense, failing to appreciate the profundity of the Pragmatists 
argument for contingency and conventionalism of language, Callicott, et.al. rest their 
entire philosophy on an a priori basis, at least in the sense that it includes statements that 
are held to be above skeptical questioning . 
I find it ironic that Callicott would accuse me of offering dichotomies, when his 
whole argument points toward reification of linguistic distinctions.  He criticizes me as 
follows: “Norton seems to suggest that the epistemological alternatives for worldviews 
are starkly contrasting: 
(a) we may regard a worldview, such as the evolutionary ecological worldview, to 
be ‘self-evident, discovered ‘a priori, and ‘independent of culture’; or (b) we may regard 
such a worldview to be true (or right) according to Hadley’s definition—namely, that 
which prevails in the long run—because it enables the culture that believes in it to 
survive and flourish.”    
Callicott, et.al. fail to find Pragmatism in Leopold’s thought because they are  
mistaken in characterizing Pragmatism and, especially, in characterizing the elements of 
Pragmatism that I think deeply influenced Leopold.  This is evident in Callicott, et. al’s 
repeated implications that someone who accepts the radical contingency of language 
automatically treats differences in linguistic usage as trivial and unimportant. (p. 461)  
For Pragmatists, this radical contingency is implied if one questions essentialism and 
Aristotelian “natural kinds”) (Dewey, 1910).   Callicott, et.al. thus attribute to 
Pragmatism a negative view of the importance of language, when in fact pragmatists 
touted language as an adaptation of great importance for survival.  For true Pragmatists, 
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who reject all forms of essentialism and belief in natural kinds, the radical contingency of 
language means we can finally understand language as a tool of the understanding, to be 
used and tested in different situations.   One expects language to be at the heart of our 
belief structure, our reasoning, and our orientation to the world. Their point—once 
having given up the ideational and the referential theories of meaning and the “logical 
truths” of scholasticism, having located meaning in social interactions, language and 
logic become tools that shape our world and make it manageable.   Apparently, none of 
the sextet of critics has heard of “semiotics” or the “Pragmatics of language”. 
The Callicottians’ cluelessness about Pragmatism is perhaps most obvious in their 
dogged emphasis on Leopold’s use of “truth” as the subject of Hadley’s definition of 
“right.” My suggestion that, for Pragmatists, the line between “truth” and “right action” is 
sufficiently faint that it was unsurprising that Leopold made this substitution of “truth” 
for “right” in the otherwise direct quotation (in 1923), is based on the Pragmatist view of 
language.  This view of language is based on Bernstein’s 4th attribute: “contingency.”  If 
one looks more deeply at this contingency as applied to language, according to the 
Pragmatists, one finds an intimate relationship between knowledge, action, and 
community.  Indeed, knowledge is tested and shaped by communal action, rather than by 
the existence of a mechanical, predictable world that causes our perceptions and 
“corresponds” to our assertions. This Pragmatist point, later discussed by Wittgenstein in 
his discussion of language games and forms of life (Wittgenstein, 1953, ), suggests that 
cultures living in different environments will evolve different linguistic and conceptual 
tools. Their knowledge of their environment, and their ability to act and survive in that 
environment, are so intertwined that having the truth allows right action and acting 
rightly is a sign of having the truth.  Once one becomes comfortable with Pragmatists’ 
understanding of knowledge as integral to action—and with their suspicions of the fact-
value dichotomy more generally—then one might say, for example, that members of a 
culture have found the “truth” about their land and habitat if they have developed a set of 
practices that allow them (and their practices) to evolve and survive in the environment 
they have made their “place.”  Speaking informally, the test of truth is action in a specific 
situation, and acting in a specific situation gives meaning to the truths we articulate. 
Part 2B:  Leopold’s Pragmatism 
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I hope I have now laid to rest the idea that Leopold resisted the idea that language 
is conventional and that he embraced a belief in metaphysics as pre-determining the 
meanings of words.  His obvious awareness of this idea is sprinkled throughout the final 
section of Some Fundamentals, and even Callicott, et.al. recognize at least 5 references to 
the vagaries/contingencies of language in the final three pages of the text.  Leopold relied 
upon this conventionalism as he compared different worldviews from Ezekiel, to 
Ouspensky, to Muir, to the anthropocentric theists and the anthropocentric resource 
scientists. He saw these as alternative perspectives, each of which has its own language 
that highlights insights, but also suffers from weaknesses and inappropriate implications. 
Because he accepted the conventional nature of language, and recognized how languages 
adopted by “managers” shape their behavior, he appreciated both the power—and the 
lability--of ways of talking.  He saw, also, that the ultimate test of a set of conventions, 
linguistically and institutionally shaped, is the success of the set of behaviors of the 
culture that lives in a place through a language. 
Second, the key breakthrough point that Leopold took from Hadley and the 
Pragmatists was the recognition that, once one rejects foundationalism and essentialism 
and embraces the contingency of language, the only basis human beings have to learn, 
whether in science or in ethics, is from experience.  The experience in question, however, 
is not individual “Cartesian” or “Lockean” experience, it is not understood as chopped up 
into atomistic “images” which somehow “picture” reality, floating in spaceless 
consciousness:  it is “social experience” (Bernstein’s theme # 3). Unlike Locke, Hume, 
and Callicott, who understand the senses as gateways for fragmentary images and 
impressions in the private minds of individuals, Pragmatists rely on a more action-
oriented understanding of communal experience in cooperation as active experimentation 
in the face of felt problems.  By discussing the success and failure of cultures, Leopold 
follows Hadley and other Pragmatists in embracing the community level as the location 
at which truth and falsity are adjudicated, as individual actions and the meanings of those 
actions are inseparable from the stories themselves.  Hadley and Leopold, that is, were 
adopting a Darwinian idea analogically and loosely, saying that, given the social nature 
of “logic,” every culture can be understood as an experiment in living in a place.  And the 
longevity of such experiments are a test both of the actions taken and the beliefs and 
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explanations associated by the culture with those actions. 
This is the central idea that I think Leopold adopted; that experience is the 
ultimate arbiter of truth and right; the method of experience. While it is often called the 
“scientific” method, for Pragmatists, it applies to morals no less than to scientific 
hypotheses.   A process analogous to individual selection as it occurs in nonsocial 
animals also occurs within cultures; cultures will survive if their practices are adaptive to 
their place, otherwise, they will not survive.  This is the Darwinian test, invoked in the 
reference to Hadley’s definition of “truth” in Some Fundamentals. 
Leopold and Hadley both used Hadley’s definition/criterion as a shorthand to 
express an extension of Darwinism to cultures; and since behavior, not ideology, is what 
determines survival, the motto is a brief way of endorsing the crucial role of 
“experience”—being put to the test by a changing and sometimes hostile environment in 
the place the culture inhabits is the test of survival. The complex of linguistic forms and 
acts, the culture, and the practices intertwined with the language, are ultimately tested by 
success of the “experimenters” not by comparison to a pre-linguistic world. (Dewey, 
Reconstruction).  Beliefs are sorted by the success of the cultures that hold and act on 
them. We see this experimental spirit in Leopold’s disdain for conservation theorizing in 
a vituperative he would no doubt hurl at most environmental ethicists today:  “We have 
many ideas as to what needs to be done, and these ideas quite naturally conflict.  We are 
in danger of pounding the table about them, instead of going out on the land and giving 
them a trial.  The only really new thing which this game policy suggests is that we quit 
arguing over abstract ideas, and instead go out and try them.”  (quoted in Meine and 
Knight, 1999, p. 211) 
We also see Leopold’s Pragmatism in his pluralism—a manifestation that may be 
hidden to anyone who insists on reading Leopold as a monist who thought he had 
found—or would ever find—the true “metaphysical foundations” of the land ethic. 
Pluralism both permeates and shapes Leopold’s discussion in the final part of the 1923 
paper.  The most obvious of these passages comes at the end of Leopold’s discussion of 
Ouspensky and organicism; after exhibiting obvious interest and respect for this position, 
Leopold says, “There is not much discrepancy, except in language, between this 
[organicist] conception of a living earth, and the conception of a dead earth, with 
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enormously slow, intricate, and interrelated functions among its parts, as given by 
physics, chemistry, and geology.” (1923, p. 139)  This is as clear an expression of 
William James’s idea of living in a “pluriverse” as one is likely to find (James, 1909), 
and its expression of the Pragmatist idea of contingency is made even more obvious 
given Leopold’s repeated cautions about the contingency and ambiguity of language. 
My reference to James, here, is deserving of further comment.  Callicott, et. al., 
seem to think that I am claiming that Hadley was the only source of Pragmatist ideas that 
might have influenced Leopold while he was in New Haven.  This is highly unlikely, 
given the historical context.  In the first decade of the 20th century, Pragmatism was 
sweeping through New England’s social and intellectual life and, especially, creating a 
new voice in philosophy departments in the intellectual centers. By 1909, when Leopold 
left New Haven, Pragmatism had a strong foothold in Burlington, VT, the University of 
Chicago, and the University of Michigan.  It is implausible to think that these ideas had 
not penetrated to New Haven, and Leopold would have certainly encountered this new 
“Darwinian” philosophy, applied to truth/epistemology, to right action, and to social and 
political issues.  As Piers Stephens has pointed out to me (personal communication), 
there are passages in which Leopold sounds very Jamesian, including one passage where 
he apparently borrows an analogy from James; we know, from Meine (1988, p. 160) that 
Leopold and his wife Estella read and discussed philosophy readings that included 
James.vi  While other exposures to Pragmatist ideas may be unprovable at this point, 
given the intellectual climate of the times, Leopold could have picked up ideas from 
many possible conduits. Leopold saw  Hadley’s definition as a particularly trenchant 
statement of the experiential criterion of truth and right, signaling the Darwinian ideas of 
Pragmatists.   
The suggestion that Leopold was influenced by, and worked closely with 
pragmatists is not mere speculation.  Developing the idea of a “third way”, a non-
utilitarian intellectual core of leaders who were unquestionably “progressives,” but who 
rejected economic reductionism and economic determinism, Ben Minteer has provided 
the intellectual and cultural history to show that Leopold was one of a number of 
“second-generation” conservationists.  These conservationists, influenced by Dewey and 
other pragmatists, conceived of their task as, first of all to criticize economic 
 17
utilitarianism, and second to create a strong form of “civic environmentalism” that 
focused on building conservation character and on identifying an emergent public 
interest.  In Leopold’s case, this involved developing, as a core idea, the goal of 
identifying and serving “the public interest,” and incorporating this idea into his later, 
expansive idea of “land health”  (Minteer, 2006).  This intellectual history supports the 
view that Leopold’s thought was integrated into the broader, third-way approach of 
intellectual leaders who broke decidedly from Pinchot, rejecting economic utilitarianism 
and rapid economic growth, and embracing a pragmatist-inspired goal of seeking the 
public good through civic conservation.  This view of Leopold, as engaged, inquisitive, 
interactive, and civic minded fits what we know of Leopold far more than would a view 
that sees him as a loner and an out-lier who dismisses his friends and associates views as 
“ridiculous” and “preposterous.” 
Leopold’s use of Hadley’s definition, unfootnoted and no doubt quoted from 
memory, was Leopold’s way of embracing Darwinian natural selection as the ultimate 
test of truth.  If an individual can survive, this implies it is “adapted” to its environment; 
if a species survives, this means that a breeding population of that species contains genes 
that allow survival in the environment they evolve within; the final step, endorsed by 
Hadley and Leopold, is to apply this Darwinian idea (analogically) at the level of 
cultures: a culture that has adapted to an environment, including its extremes of flood and 
drought, will be marked in that culture’s survival over multiple generations.  This key 
idea of Pragmatism, then, that experience provides the only epistemological test of both 
truth and right, remained constant for Leopold from 1923 until his death.  
Part 2C:  Rescuing Leopold (and Norton) from Callicott’s Misattributions 
In this Part. I will show that Callicott’s interpretation of my attribution of 
Pragmatist influences on Leopold is based on a confusion.  Callicott fails to separate 
Hadley’s Darwinist criterion of truth and right from Hadley’s cheerleading for capitalism, 
and his insensitivity to issues we would today refer to as “imperialistic.”  In fact, I will 
show that Leopold (following a hint from Hadley), used Hadley’s definition/criterion 
against Hadley’s capitalistic ideals, reversing Hadley’s argument for capitalism. 
If one accepts the obvious evidence of a pluralistic viewpoint in Leopold’s work, 
pluralism based in the contingency of language, then one can read the 1923 essay very 
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differently than Callicott, et.al. do.  Callicott and company apparently failed to note my 
clear statement that Leopold in fact turned Hadley’s definition back upon the pro-
Capitalist ideology that Hadley endorsed.  The key to this understanding—that Leopold 
incorporated Hadley’s definition as a criterion for judging cultures, but that he rejected 
Hadley’s optimistic Capitalism, lies in Hadley’s own qualification of his criterion.  He 
says (quoted in Norton, 2005, p. 68) “Of course this is a doctrine that needs to be applied 
with great care,” because such a test is fraught with the “danger that we may take too 
short periods of history under observation, and think that an idea or an institution has won 
the race when it is riding most hurriedly toward its downfall.” 
I explicitly showed how Leopold used Hadley’s definition and associated 
criterion, independently of Hadley’s capitalism, but in fact to call those very ideas into 
question.  He doubted Hadley’s praise of capitalism because Hadley had not, as Leopold 
had, seen how capitalism and European grazing culture failed to respect the limitations 
inherent in the arid land of the Southwest.  I say: “ Leopold based his arguments on his 
own experience, and in this case he concluded that the institutions and managerial 
practices of European culture were not well adapted to the arid, local landscapes”   
(Norton, 2005, p. 69).  Thus he reversed Hadley’s judgment, which is just what Hadley 
apparently encouraged in his warning against finding ‘truth’ in societies based on a too-
short period of evaluation.  Leopold, after looking at the evidence regarding the current 
status of resource systems in the Southwest, concluded that rapid economic expansion 
and high levels of exploitation of the fragile lands under his control represented an 
example of what Hadley had referred to when he cautioned that it is possible for a culture 
to consider itself about to ‘win the race’ even “when it is riding most hurriedly toward its 
downfall.” 
We can now see that much of Callicott-and-company’s detailed argumentation, to 
the effect that Hadley had many beliefs Leopold apparently rejected is simply irrelevant 
to the issue of the role he gave that definition in his argument in 1923.  I never said, for 
example, that Leopold accepted Hadley’s pro-capitalist leanings or his implication that 
the Darwinian test would favor capitalist political economy.  What I said was that 
Leopold adopted a Darwinian “model” for deciding questions of who, and under what 
circumstances, a culture can claim to have the truth/right. Hadley’s criterion/definition 
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provided Leopold with a basis for criticizing the damage land management of his time 
had done in only a little over a generation. Using this criterion/definition to cut through 
ideology and focus on practice did not, however, entail also adopting Hadley’s 
capitalistic and imperialistic views. Given that I never said Leopold endorsed the ideas 
Callicott and company call “brutal,” and  “jingoistic,” I can significantly narrow the 
defense of my case that Leopold was deeply influenced by the Pragmatist Hadley’s 
employment of a specific “model” for deciding questions that once lurked in the 
undecidable area of thought called “ideology.”vii 
Part 3:  The Organization and the import of “Conservation as a Moral Issue,” the 
Final Section of “Some Fundamentals” (1923) 
The central error Callicott, et. al. make in understanding Leopold’s meaning can 
best be seen by examining the overall structure of the essay, Some Fundamentals and, 
more specifically, the internal argumentative structure of its concluding section, 
“Conservation as a Moral Issue.” I contend that their reading of this passage fails to 
identify a coherent argument; instead, thy treat the concluding section as severed from the 
general argument of the paper and, especially, they fail to exhibit the internal structure of 
Leopold’s argument in the concluding section of the essay.  In this Part, I show that the 
three pages of that final essay comprise a coherent argument, an argument that Callicott, 
et.al. miss because they ignore the “signposts” that outline the general thrust of Leopold’s  
argument.    
Callicott, et. al.’s errors, however, begin with their broader failure to read the 
concluding section as an appropriate conclusion to the broader argument of the entire 
essay, “Some Fundamentals.”  This essay was a summary of what Leopold had learned 
by applying his perhaps unmatched observational abilities and associated tenacity in 
keeping a written record of changes he observed in the land.  The paper was, in effect, a 
summary of his assessment, based on “horseback reconnaissance” of the various natural 
systems of the Southwest and of the impacts of the policies he, other governmental land 
managers, and private landowners were having on that land.  The concluding section 
reacted to Leopold’s empirical summary that cited multiple cases (overgrazing, 
destruction of watercourses, etc.) of degradation of resources under the land-management 
regimes of the Europeans. The paper  “graded” management of the federal forest lands of 
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the Southwest and concluded that current management was not protecting important 
resources such as grasslands and watercourses.   Recognizing this, we should read the 
concluding section of the essay as a systematic search for a moral system that provides a 
critique of actions that, taken for short-term economic gain, can be seen, empirically, to 
lead to degradation of land. 
Having first recognized that “Conservation as a Moral Issue” is the conclusion of 
a larger discussion, it is now possible to see the final section as functioning on two levels.   
On one level, it provides a “survey” of possible ethics but also, and more importantly, it 
states a coherent argument that, in dealing with the public and decision makers, the 
anthropocentric position—despite its susceptibility to misuse and despite the many ways 
in which it creates deep ironies for human beings and human managers, can provide an 
ethic that is sufficient to guide us toward better policies.  One need not, on this approach 
to the essay and to the section, see Leopold as adopting a single ethic and criticizing or 
ridiculing all alternatives.  One can see him, alternatively, as looking for a system or 
systems of thought that would support his criticisms of specific practices he and his 
colleagues engage in, and as a guide toward better policies.  
Yet another irony in the Callicottians’ attack on my interpretation of Leopold is 
that they suggest (p. 470) that I treated Leopold as dogmatic.  On Callicott, et. al’s 
interpretation, however, Leopold is taken to rejecting anthropocentrism as “so ridiculous 
that it should not be dignified by dispute” and “preposterous.” Leopold, on this view, 
faced with the fact that all of his scientific colleagues, and all of the religious people he 
knew, believed fervently that the earth was made for humans, and yet he would not 
dignify their beliefs with even a counter-argument?  Is it plausible that, even if Leopold 
did also (a separate question) reject Hadley’s criterion in 1923 as Callicott says, that he 
would call out the name of his college president in order to denounce his ideas as 
“ridiculous”?  As Callicott, et. al., emphasizes, Leopold was not a militaristic, 
confrontational type of person, and I agree that he would never have followed Hadley 
into the imperialism Callicott, et.al. try to associate with my interpretation.  On Callicott, 
et.al’s interpretation of Leopold’s failure to dispute the point—as a dismissal of the 
serious beliefs and commitments of everyone he knew—Leopold would be a dogmatic, 
dictatorial, non-cooperative person, and calls out individuals he once respected for 
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ridicule.  In other words, a Leopold who dismisses his friends’ deepest beliefs as 
“preposterous, and ridicules people he once revered, all implications of the callicottian’s 
interpretation of Leopold’s reference to Hadley, wouldn’t be Leopold. 
The first step in responding directly to Callicott, et.al.’s interpretation of 
“Conservation as a Moral Issue,” is of course to respond to their rather curious point, a 
point that Callicott has raised on many occasions, and once again with others in the paper 
under discussion here, that Leopold is engaged in irony.  What is surprising is that 
Callicott somehow thinks this acknowledgement settles the issue about what Leopold 
meant in referring to Hadley’s definition.  I agree that there is irony involved in this 
section; I will show, however, that if one recognizes the true structure of Leopold’s 
argument, the irony does not obviate the use Leopold makes of Hadley’s definition within 
his argument, nor does it suggest that Leopold was rejecting that definition. 
Callicott, et.al. think the attribution of irony to Leopold settles the issue of 
interpretation because they believe that, if a sentence is intended ironically, or used 
ironically, this implies or leads us to expect that the speaker of that sentence believes the 
sentence to be false.  He says, “people do not usually state things ironically when they 
think they are true. On the contrary, people usually state things ironically when they think 
they are false.  That, we contend, is exactly what Leopold does in ‘Some Fundamentals” 
when he writes, ‘(How happy a definition is that one of Hadley’s which states, “Truth is 
that which prevails in the long run”!)’ (Callicott, et. al., p. 465)  But there is no reason to 
think that this sentence, while part of a clearly ironic passage, was thought by Leopold to 
be false. To take an analogy, on Callicott’s understanding of irony, the following 
sentence would be confused or at least highly anomalous:  “Ironically, Pro-Life advocates 
who oppose birth control and sex education actually increase the prevalence of 
abortions.”  Whether this sentence is actually true or not, when I hear a Pro-Choice 
advocate utter this sentence, I hardly question that they think the sentence is true and, 
being true, expresses an irony.  If it were true that sentences used ironically are normally 
considered false by their speakers, every instance of the following sentence forms, 
however completed, would be confused or at least likely to be considered anomalous:  “It 
is an ironic fact that…” or, once we discovered the truth that……, the full ironies of the 
situation became obvious.” So, I begin by challenging the implied premise that, if 
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Leopold is engaged in irony in the passage in question, he must be rejecting and even 
“ridiculing” Hadley’s definition. 
Callicott quotes one definition of “irony” as “the use of words to express 
something other than and especially the opposite of the literal meaning” (p.   ).  But this is 
not the appropriate definition for the case at hand.  The second definition offered in 
Webster’s Unabridged is the appropriate one: “A combination of circumstances or a 
result that is the opposite of what might be expected or considered appropriate: as, it was 
an irony of fate that the fireboat burned and sank.”  (Webster’s Unabridged, p. 970). 
Contra Callicott’s understanding, it is hardly suggested that the fireboat did not burn and 
sink, but rather that it ironically did itself in in its nefarious purpose.  Similarly, Leopold 
thought it ironic that all cultures seem to believe the earth is for them, and yet they 
disappear, and the earth survives.  What Hadley’s definition contributes to the irony is 
that (since Darwin) we know that what counts is not their ideology but their 
“experience”—their practices which determine how long they survive.  According to 
Darwin, and Hadley’s “happy” definition, their claimed “nobility” is tested in their 
longevity, not in their ideology.  
In what follows, I will alternate between attributions and discussion of what 
Leopold said as one moves through the passages, which are set in normal type, with 
meta-comments (in italics) showing how these elements of Leopold’s thinking actually 
formed a tight and carefully reasoned argument. 
The first “signpost” is the transition into the final section where Leopold 
acknowledges his preceding “data” based on his “reconnaissance” missions in the 
Southwest territories considers conservation “merely as an economic issue.”  He 
immediately argues that, while he has found adequate economic reasons to criticize 
current practice in prior Sections, he will now consider “its moral aspects.” This 
signpost makes clear that the moral discussion to follow is clearly motivated by his 
assessment of resource use earlier in the essay. 
Starting with this orientation of the final section as a culmination of the 
“accounting” system Leopold had used in evaluating long-term impacts of the 
management of grazing, we see that Leopold is searching for an ethic that will be 
applicable to his observations.  In this context, and given Leopold’s emphasis on grazing 
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lands and trout streams in the early, empirical sections of the paper, Leopold poses the 
question:  What normative/moral ideas are there that could be enlisted as moral resources 
to support and guide a conservation morality? 
Leopold considers several candidates: 
1) Ezekiel’s admonition to protect waters and pastures, with several possible 
justifications mentioned by Leopold: 
a) a matter of self-respect 
b) as a matter of “craft” 
c) a broader “concept—that “the privilege of possessing the earth entails the 
responsibility of passing it on, the better for our use, not only to immediate posterity, but 
to the Unknown Future.” (1923, p. 139)  Note the strong emphasis on concerns about the 
future, and 
d) the soil is respected as one respects a living thing. 
I read this reference as essentially introductory, acknowledging the importance 
and longstanding respect for productive land, but suggesting a range of more specific 
explications of this “responsibility.  So he uses Ezekiel to suggest that there is a range of 
possible ethics, or interpretations, possible.  Interpretation 1d leads Leopold to explore 
organicism as the first candidate to be examined as a basis for conservation morality. 
2)  Ouspensky’s organicism:  Leopold next notes that if we can follow Ouspensky in 
seeing the earth as a whole, living through slow changes, we might perceive not only 
organs with coordinated functions, “but possibly also that process of consumption and 
replacement which in biology we call the metabolism, or growth”  (p. 139).  Leopold 
clearly finds this idea inspiring, and concludes that it would provide “one reason why we 
can not destroy the earth with moral impunity; namely, that the ‘dead’ earth is an 
organism possessing a certain kind and degree of life, which we intuitively respect as 
such.  (p. 140).  Note that he refers to this as “one reason,” not “the” reason as he would 
if he is searching for the one correct ethic. 
Leopold’s viewpoint on the discussion of organicism, and its place in the 
argument, are revealed in two “meta-comments”, one embedded in the discussion of 
organicism, and one coming directly at its end.  First, within the discussion, Leopold 
notes (as quoted above) that “There is not much discrepancy, except in language, 
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between this conception of a living earth,” and the earth as studied by natural scientists.  
I take this to be a straightforward recognition that, useful as they may be, these different 
“languages” represent different perspectives or accounts of the world, and that it is not 
given to us to know which of these accounts (independent of the languages we use) is to 
be given absolute priority. Leopold’s point is not to belittle the difference indicated by 
languages, but to recognize how different languages signal underlying differences in 
perspectives and insights.  
Second, immediately after positively discussing the possible obligation we have to 
treat the earth well because it is a living thing, Leopold introduces another, more 
practical consideration: “Possibly, to most men of affairs, this reason is too intangible to 
either accept or reject as a guide to human conduct” (p. 140).  This comment speaks not 
to the truth of organicism, but rather to its efficacy in convincing policy makers.  Both 
the internal and the external comments make perfect sense if we assume Leopold is 
examining several moral bases as possible supports for a conservation morality, and 
considering strengths and weaknesses of each.  Undaunted in his quest for a possibly 
effective moral basis for conservation, Leopold goes on to discuss: 
3)  Muir and rights of rattlesnakes.  Leopold next considers a stronger version of 
nonanthropocentrism, one due to John Muir, that challenges “the great human 
impertinence” that claims the earth is solely for human use and enjoyment and asserts the 
rights of other species against humans  (p. 140). 
Here, Leopold’s argument here is rather dense and a bit confusing.  Just as with 
organicism, Leopold clearly recognizes the inspirational nature of Muir’s views and he 
also agrees that anthropocentrism and human arrogance is unjustified and impertinent.  
He mixes this discussion of an idea he finds attractive with a recognition that the idea 
evokes deep ironies, but he also realizes that anthropocentrism is, and will remain for the 
foreseeable future, the dominant idea, accepted by the major religions of the world, and 
by the practical, resource scientist and managers--the “Men of affairs” Leopold worked 
with. 
At this point—the crucial point in the argument of the section—Leopold makes a 
bold move:  “Since most of mankind today profess either one of the [anthropocentric’] 
religions or the scientific school of thought which is likewise [anthropocentric], I will not 
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dispute the point.” P. 140. The key passage here, where Leopold declines to dispute 
anthropocentrism, is crucial to the interpretive debate discussed in this paper.  Did 
Leopold decide not to dispute it because he had already rejected it, as Callicott et.al. 
claim?  Or, did he decide not to dispute it because, as a pluralist, he didn’t have to?  He 
could simply incorporate it as one moral concept or tool among others. Callicott, et.al. 
insist that Leopold decided not to dispute anthropocentrism because he thought that 
anthropocentrism was “so ridiculous that it should not be dignified by dispute,” ( P. 463)  
but this interpretation is inconsistent with what is implied by the syntax of Leopold’s 
sentence: Leopold says, “Since most of mankind today...,  I will not dispute the point.”  If 
he were rejecting anthropocentrism out of hand as ridiculous, he would have referred to 
evidence for its falsity; accepting it “since” others do is thus to accept it as a working 
principle, despite its unattractive aspects, not to reject it as obviously false.  The pluralist 
Leopold, considering the strengths and weaknesses of several conservation moralities, 
recognizes the attractiveness of a nonanthropocentric position, especially to Darwinians 
like himself, but also considers the usefulness of ideas in achieving productive discourse 
and cooperative action, and so he expects to use anthropocentrism most of the time. 
Leopold, admittedly bothered by the arrogance of anthropocentrism, slips in one 
more barb against scientists, as he says to them: “it is just barely possible that God 
himself likes to hear birds sing and see flowers grow.” But then he immediately returns to 
the theme of concern for the future: “Granting that the earth is for man—there is still a 
question: what man?” (p. 141).  And it is at this point that Leopold introduces a 
comparative argument about the adaptations of the various cultures that had inhabited 
the Southwest, which he lists as “the cliff dwellers,” “the Pueblos”, the “Spaniards”, 
and then the “Americans”.  Of the cultures that preceded the American attempt, Leopold 
says, they “have flourished here,” and we may “truthfully say of our four [sic?] 
predecessors that they left the earth alive, undamaged.” To Leopold—fresh from his 
critique of current land management in the Southwest—Hadley’s definition, “Truth is 
that which prevails in the long run,” allows a comparison.   The current grazing culture 
cannot stand up to the test of many generations, and hence the Americans were proving 
they did not have as much “truth” as prior, indigenous cultures that had adapted 
gradually and survived hundred-year storms and hundred-year droughts.   
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This line of reasoning occurs right in the midst of Leopold’s development of 
reasons why anthropocentrists, if they are “logically [anthropocentric],”would correct 
currently damaging practices.  If there is “indeed, a special nobility inherent in the 
human race—a special cosmic value, distinctive from and superior to all other life—by 
what token will it be manifest?” Leopold answers his own rhetorical question with 
another question posing a dilemma: “by a society decently respectful of its own and all 
other life, capable of inhabiting the earth without defiling it?” or  choosing the fate of the 
self-exterminating potato bug? (p. 141)  If Leopold were writing today, he would no 
doubt have referred to the obviously preferable first choice as “living sustainably,” and 
this interpretation shows how Hadley’s application of Darwinism to cultures allowed 
Leopold to show that, even if he grants anthropocentrism, he has a powerful, 
intertemporal ethic that will support his arguments for changed policies and for rejection 
of Pinchot’s economically driven, rapid-development-oriented management efforts, 
whether or not he finds support for emerging ideas like organicism or rights of other 
species.   
As a pluralist, Leopold did not have to win the argument against 
anthropocentrism because he thought both anthropocentrism—especially long-sighted 
anthropocentrism—and nonanthropocentrism offer insights.  More importantly, he 
thought that very similar policies are good for humans and for protecting nonhuman 
species.  In the case in point, protecting grasslands and recovering watercourses is good 
for humans and good for wildlife.  Strategically, his faith in the convergence of human 
and nonhuman interests allowed Leopold to play it either way, depending on his audience 
and his purposes. 
On my interpretation, however, the truth of Hadley’s definition is also essential to 
Leopold’s argument because it provides him with an effective comparison between the 
current, failing management of the lands of the Southwest and prior, indigenous cultures 
that had developed their practices over many generations and were able to survive and 
adapt.  The moral of the story is:  unless land managers in the Southwest shape up, and 
perhaps learn some of the “truths” of long-lasting indigenous cultures, they will indeed 
“be judged in ‘the derisive silence of eternity.’”  In this light, it is possible to see that the 
definition—an invocation of a Darwinian model of cultural selection, is both ironic, and 
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taken to express a profound truth.  It puts the claims of all anthropocentric cultures to the 
test of adaptability, showing that ideological claims ring hollow if the culture cannot 
survive.  
If Leopold is understood as a pluralist, the key passage in which Leopold decides 
not to contest anthropocentrism does not signal a rejection of anthropocentrism in favor 
of nonanthropocentrism.  Rather, it recognizes that some ideas, like organicism and 
rights for rattlesnakes, are important: they represent one valid way to understand the 
world.  If, however, we hope to build a conservation morality that has some hope of 
unifying humans behind a single philosophy of conservation, that philosophy would have 
to embrace anthropocentrism as the fulcrum point of a management ethic”. 
Anthropocenrism has, despite its weakness, also a key strength that—if one can 
strip away the misuses—makes it eminently useful: it posits that humans are the most 
“noble” of creatures.  In the remainder of the essay, the last two paragraphs, Leopold 
explains how, despite its arrogant tendencies deserving of irony, a proper understanding 
of the anthropocentric morality of protection of resources for posterity will be sufficient 
to correct management mistakes and repair the systems which bad management had 
damaged and threatened (provided humans claiming nobility act consistently with their 
claimed pedigree).  In the end, then, Leopold does not mock, but endorses with respect 
claims of human nobility:  In “A Monument to a Pigeon,” Leopold (1949) recognized 
both the irony and the truth of that claim, recognizing with Darwin our “kinship” with 
other species, Leopold says “We, who have lost our pigeons, mourn the loss.  Had the 
funeral been ours, the pigeons would hardly have mourned us.  In this fact, rather than in 
Mr. Dupont’s nylons or Mr. Vannevar Bush’s bombs, lies objective evidence of our 
superiority over the beasts.”viii 
4.  “Noble” Anthropocentrism.  After having decided not to dispute anthropocentrism, 
Leopold shifts into a much more positive mode of argument.  Meeting the  
anthropocentrists on their own ground, Leopold notes that, inherent in the 
anthropocentric position is a belief in the special nobility of humans.  If anthropocentrists 
are “logically [anthropocentric] (meaning they actually live up to their arrogant claims), 
then they will protect resources for the future and be respectful of other life forms.  
Leopold, in these last two paragraphs—the location of the much-disputed quotation from 
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Hadley—shows that an anthropocentric philosophy demands living sustainably and that 
this sustainability, based in an obligation to posterity, will also support protection of other 
species as the birthright of future generations. 
In this Part I have shown that Leopold developed an argument in an open-
minded, pluralistic mood; he considered several conservation moralities and seems to 
end up with a broadly anthropocentric approach, despite the inspirational attraction of 
organicism, Muir’s nonanthropocentrism, and despite the ironies involved in the ideology 
of anthropcentrism.  Callicott, et. al. are correct to see irony in anthropocentrism if it 
foolishly claims that God made the flowers and birds for us alone, and in the belief of 
each culture that lived there that the earth is made for them, but that they have passed 
away despite their culture-centered ideology, and the earth survived without them.  These 
ironies, however, work as literary filigree embellishing the central argument:  whatever 
ideology or metaphysics a people of a culture believe, Leopold would put his faith in 
experience, the success and failure of the practices in which a culture engages.  “Truth is 
that which prevails in the long run.” 
Part 4:  Keeping Score: Counting and Explaining away Passages in Defense of 
Orthodoxy 
Callicott et.al. make a lot of the existence and the timing of several occasions on 
which Leopold mentioned Hadley and quoted Hadley’s definition.  Because they have so 
totally missed the intention of Leopold’s discussion in “Conservation as a Moral Issue,” 
they get all tangled up in a hopelessly implausible attempt to explain away Leopold’s use 
of the definition.  They admit that the first reference to Hadley, in a 1918 lecture to the 
Garden Club was clearly endorsing Hadley’s view, but they argue that, of the three 
remaining references to Hadley, one is ambiguous, one clearly involves rejecting 
Hadley’s views, while ridiculing Hadley (the one we are considering in Some 
Fundamentals), and the fourth, which was the last reference, after having ridiculed the 
idea a year earlier, is “enigmatic.”   
The first reference, from the Garden Club speech, in which he introduces 
Hadley’s idea as the great idea of his time, Leopold says: “When an idea has been tried 
by fire and adopted, it is known as the Truth.  So firmly has this evolutionary character of 
Truth has been established that one of the modern philosophers—President Hadley of 
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Yale—now defines the truth as that which “prevails in the long run.” (Quoted in Norton, 
205, p. 66).  Even given his mission to deny Leopold embraced this idea, Callicott et. al. 
cannot deny that this 1918 passage is respectful of Hadley’s definition and even reverent 
in his reference to Hadley.  Then the gyrations begin.   They next discuss a 1921 
reference and, with very slim evidence that Leopold may have been using irony, calls this 
one too ambiguous to classify.   
With these two references as background, Callicott, et. al., amazingly then argue 
that by 1923, Leopold had not only rejected Hadley’s definition, but had also come to see 
it as false, ridiculous and dangerous.  So far, then, after three citations, we have at best a 
tie from their point of view, even if we grant Callicott, et.al.’s  interpretation of the 
contested controversy about how to interpret “Some Fundamentals”.  Then we see that 
Callicott et. al. can only maintain this question-begging tie by finding reason to treat the 
subsequent reference, in 1924/5 as “enigmatic”.  How likely, however, is it that 
Leopold—or any author--would choose a statement which he takes to be false, and 
ridiculously so, as the epigram for an essay?  Not likely, at least, not unless the author 
sets out in the paper to correct the error so highlighted—and there is no claim that 
Leopold denied or even qualified his epigram in the essay.   
All that Callicott et.al. provide is an attempt to conextualize away the second and 
fourth citations by noting they were written in contexts where Leopold was concerned 
about conflict. Once one recognizes, as shown above, that the ideas Leopold borrowed 
from Hadley are independent of Hadley’s ideas about militaristic conflicts, then these 
contextual connections are simple coincidences.  So Callicott and colleagues are left with 
little basis for claiming the second and fourth references to Hadley are “ambiguous” or 
“enigmatic” and even if they are, and are not counted, Callicott, et.al., are left only with 
their repeated claims that Leopold’s 1923 ridicule of Hadley’s definition is “obvious”. 
So, on this shaky basis, we are asked to believe that Leopold shifted his view of Hadley,s 
definition one hundred and eighty degrees from 1918 to 1923, but that he backslid in 
1924, giving it the honored place of an epigram.   
Callicott, et. al. also make a case that Hadley actually should be considered an 
“economist” and that he did not show any interest in Darwinian epistemology before 
1908, only one year before Leopold left Yale in 1909, implying that Leopold would have 
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had few chances to be exposed to Hadley’s political epistemology.  But this bit of 
speculation is clearly mistaken, since the book, Some Influences in Modern Philosophic 
Thought (1913), (based on McNair lectures delivered in 1912) includes as an Appendix, a 
paper (“The Influence of Charles Darwin of Historical and Political Science,”) published 
in The Psychological Review in May, 1909!  Most of my quotations from Hadley in my 
published work are taken from this Appendix.  To believe that Hadley had only acquired 
an interest in Darwinian epistemology in 1908, one would have to believe that he 
developed this interest sometime in 1908 and that he proceeded from the first inkling of 
an interest in a complex subject to publication in an important journal within just 
months—highly unlikely for a sitting college president. So, whenever Hadley started 
thinking about and writing about Darwin and truth/right, it clearly was before 1908, and 
Leopold could easily have been exposed to these ideas as Hadley was developing them, 
probably throughout Leopold’s stay in New Haven. 
Part 6:  Conclusion: What the Dualists Miss in Leopold’s Contribution  
 I believe Leopold was deeply influenced by Pragmatism; Callicott and his 
nonanthropocentric followers think he wasn’t.  What exactly is at stake?  This amounts to 
asking: in what ways does a nonPragmatist interpretation of Leopold as a monistic non-
anthropocentrist underestimate the contributions Leopold can make to our understanding 
and solution of environmental problems?  While a full answer to these questions would 
require more space than is available here, I will conclude this paper by mentioning three 
ways in which the Callicott, et. al. interpretation of “Some Fundamentals” and, 
especially, their failure to see how Pragmatism allowed Leopold to integrate science from 
multiple fields and resources with a new, more pluralistic, multi-scalar, and adaptive 
approach to environmental policy. 
 1.  Because they understand Leopold’s discussion of moral bases for conservation 
as a question of deciding between two possible ways of valuing nature, and because they 
see “Conservation as a Moral Issue” as describing a struggle between two theories of 
ethics, both of which cannot be true, on Callicott, et. al.’s interpretation, Leopold  faces 
an irreconcilable conflict between Pinchot and Muir about the nature of environmental 
values.  Then, sometime between 1920 and 1935, according to this monistic account, 
Leopold rejected his early commitment to Pinchot’s humanistic utilitarianism, and 
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adopted a full-fledged non-anthropocentric ethic that sharply distinguishes environmental 
values into instrumental and intrinsic values and privileges the intrinsic values of nature 
over the use-values humans derive from natural systems.  While Callicott sometimes 
notes that some objects can be valued in both ways, he insists that in Leopold’s post-
transformation thought, intrinsic values in nature trump all instrumental uses.      
 Because monism leads Callicott, et. al. to see values dichotomously, and because 
they see the goals of serving human interests as sharply at odds with protecting 
nonanthropocentric values, Callicott and those bewitched by his dichotomous thinking 
think Leopold, in departing from Pinchot’s Economistic utilitarianism, must have 
switched to the “opposing” side in the original debate.  If, however, one emphasizes that 
Leopold, in his brilliant simile of “learning to think like a mountain” made use of a multi-
scaled model of natural systems to analyze his errors in wildlife management, we can see 
Leopold as exploding the Pinchot-Muir dichotomy.  He recognized that human values—
and the actions pursued to secure them—unfold on a different temporal scale, associated 
with a different set of dynamics than do ecological and evolutionary processes and the 
much slower dynamics that drive them (O’Neill, et. al., 2007).   
 I credit Leopold with having made a breakthrough in understanding the multiple 
scales of time and space as presenting different challenges to human actors and managers, 
and as recognizing that concern expressed at these multiple scales can be associated with 
different ways of valuing natural systems.  On this more pluralistic interpretation, it is 
possible also to recognize that he saw the problem of finding appropriate policies to 
manage each of these dynamics, and to do so in a way that respects both human needs 
and desires, and the ecological constraints implicit in any plan to protect natural systems 
and the species that inhabit them.  Hadley’s definition was central in his attempt to 
integrate these two layers of value and associated dynamics.  Because it applies not at the 
scale of individual consumers or hunters, but rather at the scale at which we judge the 
actions and practices of a culture, Leopold was able to match his environmental 
guideline—survival in the long run—to cultures and to treat the values so pursued as 
independent of the individual wants, needs, and choices that impinge on the system on 
the shorter term and more locally.   
In my book, (2005, esp. Sections 6.3 and 6.4), I explain in detail the crucial 
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impact of Leopold’s comprehension of the multi-scalar nature of the environmental 
management problem as illustrated in his simile of thinking like a mountain.  Callicott, 
et.al’s monism creates a zero-sum game between humans and nature.  This old-think way 
of characterizing environmental problems and environmental management does not do 
justice to the subtlety of Leopold’s Darwinian vision. Leopold had defused the Pinchot-
Muir debate by finding a “third way,” a way on which the problems of management are 
necessarily multi-layered, and while there are ethical concerns on both the individual and 
cultural level, we can apply the test of experience at both scales.  At the individual scale, 
morality applies to individual actions and affects other individuals, and humans have 
struggled since time immemorial to develop fair rules for interpersonal interactions; but 
conservation morality is seen at the scale of a culture, and Leopold emphasized the 
cumulative impact that grazing culture had on the land.   
Once the problem of conservation is seen to involve multiple scales, the more 
complex conservation question becomes: are the needs and wants of individuals of the 
society being fulfilled in such a way that, over many generations, the practices developed 
indigenously allow survival for many generations?  Survival of a culture in a place is the 
ultimate test of whether it has learned, through cultural learning, to use the land and yet 
leave it “alive” to support subsequent cultures.   This is what I meant when, in (2005, pp. 
72f), I argued that Leopold created a “third way” between Pinchot’s development-
oriented utilitarianism and Muir’s choosing the side of bears in a war with humans.  
Whereas Callicott tries to tar Pinchot, all progressives, and Leopold as I interpret him, 
with the same brush, a more nuanced view of progressivism reveals a middle ground 
between Pinchot and Muir.  As Minteer (2006) has shown, Leopold fell comfortably into 
a pattern of “civic pragmatism”  that was both strongly environmental—in the active 
sense of restoration and advocacy for quality planning and development—and humanistic 
in the sense that all values, including “intrinsic”  values in nature, are human values and 
protecting them is the right—adaptational—thing to do.   
On this middle ground, productivity is valued, but the means used to produce 
goods and services by a population—the cultural practices they evolve for living in a 
place--will not be judged simply according to rapid economic growth; they must also be 
adapted in the sense that these practices allow the culture to survive.  I describe this 
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middle way as follows:  “The question…that Leopold’s model sets out to address is 
whether a given culture has, or can develop, institutions and practices that will evolve 
responsibly to changes in its ecological context.  By making the main question of survival 
one of developing institutions that are stable enough to perpetuate our current social 
values, including love of nature, and at the same time flexible enough to respond to rapid 
change both in culture and especially in the ecological context of cultures, Leopold 
shifted the question out of economics and out of ecology and into the area of active 
management.”  (Norton, 2005, pp. 72-73).  Above, in offering an alternative to Callicott’s 
dichotomous and monistic understanding of Leopold, I have tried to show how this “third 
way” was already well established for Leopold by 1923. 
2.  On the monistic model, Leopold would have come to see management 
problems as a conflict between what humans need and legitimately want, on the one 
hand, and what is “good for the land.”  According to the pluralist interpretation offered 
here, Leopold wanted an integrated ethic of management, one integrated over multiple 
levels, which allowed him to advocate different ethics depending on the nature and scale 
of a problem and also, in dealing with the public, other scientists, and decision makers to 
emphasize value orientations likely to appeal to them.  Because I see Leopold as 
adopting—in the face of so much conflict and polarization among conservationists—the 
convergence hypothesis, there need be no dissembling or hypocrisy in recognizing that, in 
protecting ecological systems by managing the impacts of human communities 
(“cultures”) at the ecological level, one is likely also to pursue policies that will protect 
the values of individual members of the culture both in the present and in the future 
(Norton, 1991; Minteer, 2009).  This encouraged him to search for an integrated set of 
policies that will protect both ecological systems at the system scale, and aggregated 
human interests (over generations) at the same time.  Since this controversy has been 
discussed in detail recently, I will only say here that the attempts to show counter-
examples to the convergence hypothesis always choose some policy that humans think is 
in their interest and then to argue that this policy has damaged or will damage natural 
systems (Minteer, 2009).  On closer look, however, in each case we find that, if we look 
at the interests of all human individuals including, for example, indigenous inhabitants of 
the system, and if we consider the long-term impacts of those policies on future people 
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living in that place, policies that harm natural systems will, on balance, also be bad for 
humans.  Nowhere is Leopold’s commitment to a convergent viewpoint more evident 
than in “Conservation as a Moral Issue,” as he considers, and draws insights from one 
after another ethic, only to conclude that what ultimately counts is not ideologies that 
divide people intellectually, but whether a culture can evolve adaptations that support 
survival for many generations. 
3.  Finally, by acknowledging that Leopold recognized the importance of 
temporal scale and intergenerational impacts, and that he began treating these impacts as 
providing a test of successful cultural adaptation to a place as early as 1923, Leopold had 
begun to think on multiple scales and had begun to organize his thinking around three 
scales of time—human, durational/experiential time, ecological time, and evolutionary 
time (Norton, 2005). Callicott, et.al’s interpretation, treating Leopold as a monistic 
anthropocentrist who converted to monistic nonanthropocentism, perpetuates the 
polarization between anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism.  Rather than seeing 
Leopold as adopting the same zero-sum reasoning that had created the polarization, 
attributing to him a key role for Pragmatic epistemology that emphasizes survivability of 
cultures as the ultimate test of “experience” shifts our attention to Leopold’s successful 
anticipation of hierarchy theory, as embodied in the simile, “learning to think like a 
mountain.”(Norton, 199x, 2005, Ch. 6).  Seeing Leopold as developing a scale-sensitive, 
multi-generational model for thinking through environmental policy quandaries enables 
one to see that Leopold, far from fighting again the first-generation conservation battles 
between Muir and Pinchot, was pointing toward a new direction, a direction that would 
emphasize “adaptation”—thereby recognizing Leopold’s anticipation of adaptive 
management processes as opportunities to learn  by doing—but it also recognizes that 
Leopold had provided a remarkable anticipation of what we would today call a concern 
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i The author graciously thanks Robert Kirkman, Ben Minteer, and Piers Stephens for 
extremely helpful suggestions on a draft of this paper.  Remaining errors are of course my 
responsibility. 
ii I will follow Callicott, et al., in the convention that capitalized “Pragmatism” will refer 
to the philosophical movement/viewpoint of American Pragmatists and their followers, 
while the uncapitalized use of the term will refer to the quotidian meaning, as a practical 
and experimental approach to everyday problems.  
iii While James showed respect for John Stuart Mill, Mill’s ethic recognized “higher and 
“lower” desires, which was combined with a strong emphasis on education.  This view 
was attractive to some pragmatists because it holds out the possibility of learning one’s 
way to more sophisticated pleasures.  That said, to suggest that pragmatists showed 
interest in Mill’s idea of preference transformation through ducation, would hardly 
establish a connection between pragmatism, utilitarianism, and capitalism, since Mill, 
who was the first advocate of a “steady-state” economy, sometimes described himself as 
a ”socialist.” So Callicott, et. al.’s attempts to drive a wedge between Leopold and the 
pragmatists by associating a pragmatist interpretation of Leopold with rampant capitalism 
are futile.  Indeed, pragmatists themselves, including especially Dewey, were serious 
critics of capitalism.  Thanks to Piers Stephens for sharpening my argument here. 
iv To understand my actual position, see Section 3.4 of (Norton 2005). 
v Note that Callicott, in other writings, seems to enthusiastically endorse a denotative 
understanding of linguistic meaning as he insists that the task before him and other 
advocates of intrinsic values in nature is a matter of “rectifying names” ( Callicott, 2002, 
p. 4. 
vi I am grateful to Piers Stephens for sharing his research that reveals the ways in which 
James’s philosophy, especially his views on experience, are represented in Leopold’s 
writings. 
vii Removing these points from controversy would apparently also undermine Callicott, 
et.al.’s attempts to show that my ideas are at odds with Flader’s excellent account and 
with Darwin, himself, to be irrelevant. 
viiiAgain, I am indebted to Piers Stephens for this important source on the question of 
“nobility” of humans.  
